This paper studies efficiency in a Nash game with optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) target. Instead of looking from the view point of degree of efficiency ("price of anarchy"), we investigate the effects of parameters in individual cost functions. We show that the aggregate cost function in the game-theoretic formulation is not automatically convex and the optimal solution of the associated constrained optimization problem is not immediate. Then we build the relation between these two formulations by indicating that the individual cost function Ci(ui) in the system optimization formulation has an approximate interpretation with the one Ji(u) in the game-theoretic formulation. We compare simulation results from both a system optimization and a user optimization (game-theoretic) approach for a single optical link. It is well known that the Nash equilibria of a game may not achieve full efficiency. We show the effects of pricing mechanisms on system performance. We also show that OSNR target can be achieved and efficiency can be possibly improved by appropriate selection of parameters.
INTRODUCTION
In optical communication networks, OSNR is considered as the dominant performance parameter in link optimization, with dispersion and nonlinearity being limited with proper link design, [7] . A signal over the same optical link can be regarded as an interfering noise for other channels (signals), which leads to degradation in the quality of service, i.e., OSNR degradation. Regulating the input optical power per channel at Source (Tx) aims to achieve a satisfactory OSNR level at Destination (Rx). Particularly in optical networks, because all wavelength-multiplexed channels in a link share the optical fiber, the total input power in a link has to be below the nonlinearity threshold, which can be regarded as the link capacity constraint. The OSNR optimization problem in optical networks belongs to a subclass of resource allocation in general communication net-works [2, 4, 18] .
Since each channel belonging to different carriers is operating at its own carrier wavelength and no communication among channels exists, the OSNR optimization problem is formulated as a noncooperative (Nash) game in [13] , where channels are the players. In the game, each channel wishes to optimize its OSNR independently. A solution to the Nash game is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) solution. Moreover, the Nash game immediately leads to distributed iterative algorithms towards finding the NE solution. In the gametheoretical formulation, channel OSNR target is not considered. It is possible that the game settles down at an NE solution where channels do not reach their OSNR target. A system optimization approach is considered in [12] and the OSNR optimization problem is formulated as one of utility maximization problems. Each channel obtains a minimum OSNR level that is slightly greater than the desired one. Meanwhile, it optimizes its input optical power considering target OSNR levels of all other channels and link capacity constraint.
In this paper we compare by simulation the two approaches, i.e., a system optimization approach and a user optimization (game-theoretic) approach, for a single optical link. The numerical results are developed based on our previous theoretic work [12] [13] [14] . It is well known that the Nash equilibria of a game may not achieve full efficiency. The inefficiency of the NE solution has been studied extensively [1, 5, 8, 15, 16, 18] . The resulting degree of the efficiency loss is known as the "price of anarchy" [11] . There has been an increasing literature in recent years trying to quantify the efficiency loss under separable costs [8] and non-separable costs [15] , respectively. In particular, results suggest that the selfish behavior of players in a Nash game may not degrade the system performance arbitrarily, provided a pricing mechanism is chosen properly [8, 18] . In this paper, we study a Nash game with non-separable cost functions and pricing mechanism is applied to improve the system performance. Instead of looking from the view point of degree of efficiency, we investigate the effects of parameters in individual cost functions. Moreover, we select the system optimization formulation as the system framework to measure the efficiency of the NE solution. We show that the aggregate cost function in the game-theoretic formulation is not automatically strictly convex and the optimal solution of the associated constrained optimization problem is not immediate. We indicate that an individual cost function Ci(ui) in the system optimization formulation has an approximate interpretation with the cost function Ji(u) in the game-theoretic formulation and is uncoupled in u, that is, it is defined with respect to ui only. We build the relation between these two formulations and compare the results based on this. We show the effects of pricing mechanisms. We also show that OSNR target can be achieved and the efficiency can be possibly improved by appropriate selection of parameters.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we first review a link OSNR model. The OSNR optimization problem is formulated and solved via game-theoretic approach [13, 14] and via system optimization approach [12] , respectively. In Section 3, we compare the cost functions in the two formulations. We show that an individual cost function in the system optimization approach can be approximately interpreted with the individual cost function in the gametheoretic approach. Then we present parameter selection strategy. By adjusting the parameters in individual cost functions, the game-theoretic approach leads to an NE solution that satisfies the OSNR constraint. After that in Section 4, we compare by simulation the results from both approaches and show that the efficiency can be improved by appropriate selection of parameters. Section 5 gives conclusions and directions for future work. We study a point-to-point optical link case (Fig. 1) . A set M = {1, . . . , m} of channels are transmitted over the link. The link consists of N cascaded spans of optical fiber each followed by an optical amplifier. All optical amplifiers have the same gain spectral shape and the gain value for channel i is Gi. We denote ui and n 0 i the signal optical power and noise optical power of channel i ∈ M at Tx, respectively. Similarly, we denote pi and ni the signal optical power and noise optical power of channel i ∈ M at Rx, respectively. Let
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T denote the vector form. Equivalently, we write (u−i, ui) with u−i = [u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , um]
T in some context to represent the same vector u. The signal optical power at Tx is typically bounded for every channel. That is, ui is in a bounded set Ωi = [0, umax] where umax is sufficiently large. The bounded set Ωi is identical for all channels. We use Ω = Ω1 × · · · × Ωm to represent the Cartesian product.
The OSNR of channel i at Rx is given by
where ASEs,i is the ASE noise power of channel i after span s and P 0 is the total power target for the link. Equivalently, (1) can be rewritten as
where
The OSNR optimization problem in optical networks belongs to a subclass of resource allocation in general communication networks [2, 18] . The OSNR model reflects that the optical power of one channel can be regarded as an interfering noise for others, which leads to the OSNR degradation. Regulating the optical powers at Tx, i.e., allocating optical resource among channels, aims to achieve a satisfied OSNR level for each channel at Rx.
User Optimization Formulation
Next from the user optimization point of view, we use the game theoretic approach to study the OSNR optimization problem. We formulate it as a noncooperative (Nash) game, where channels are the players. In the game, each channel wishes to optimize its OSNR independently, i.e., to minimize its individual cost function by adjusting its input optical power at Tx, given the input optical powers of all other channels.
Considering the link capacity constraint,
The action space is coupled:
And the action set for each channel i is the projection set
An individual cost function Ji assigned to each channel i ∈ M is defined as the difference between a pricing function Pi and a utility function Ui:
Here the utility function Ui is chosen to be a logarithmic function of the associated channel's OSNR:
where βi > 0 is a channel-defined parameter indicating the strength of the channel's desire to maximize its OSNR and ai > 0 is a scaling parameter for flexibility.
From (8) we can see that Ui is monotonically increasing in OSNRi. Hence, maximizing the utility function Ui is related to maximizing OSNRi. From (3), the utility function can be equivalently written in terms of u,
It can be checked that the utility function Ui(u−i, ui) is twice continuously differentiable, monotonically increasing and strictly concave with respect to ui. The reasons for the choice of a logarithmic function (9) as follows. A logarithmic function is analytically useful and is widely used as a utility function in flow control [9, 19] and power control [3] for general communication networks. In some cases, the logarithmic utility function is intimately associated with the concept of proportional fairness [9] . More specifically, since OSNRi is strictly increasing with respect to ui and tends to
as ui tends to infinity. The OSNR model has a striking similarity with the wireless SIR model [3] , but with a more general full system matrix Γ. Moreover, OSNR is no longer a linear function of its associated channel power. A direct logarithmic utility function of associated SIR in the wireless case can not be applied.
The pricing function consists of two terms: a linear pricing term and a regulation (penalty) term,
where αi > 0 is a pricing factor determined by the system. The linear pricing term is a linear function of the individual input power. It can be interpreted as the price a channel pays for using the system resources [17] . The linear pricing term reflects the fact that increasing one channel's power degrades the OSNR of all other channels. From the system performance point of view, the linear pricing term here is to limit the interferences of other channels caused by this channel and hence it improves the overall system performance [18] .
The regulation term is constructed by considering the link capacity constraint. It penalizes any violation of the constraint in the following way: The regulation term tends to infinity when the total power approaches the total power target P 0 , so the pricing function Pi(u−i, ui) increases without bound. Hence the system resource is preserved by forcing all channels to decrease their input powers and indirectly satisfies the link capacity constraint.
Thus the m-player Nash game is defined in terms of the cost functions Ji(u−i, ui), i ∈ M, played within the action spaceΩ. This game is called an OSNR Nash game and denoted by GAM E(M,Ωi, Ji). A vector u = (u−i, ui) is called feasible if u ∈Ω. The concept of an NE solution is well defined.
If in addition, the solution is not on the boundary of the action spaceΩ, it is called an inner NE solution.
There exists an NE solution for this m-player OSNR Nash game. Furthermore, the NE solution is inner. The following result is adapted from [13] which provides sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of of an inner NE solution. We restate here for completeness.
where βmin = minj∈M βj and αmax = maxj∈M αj .
System Optimization Formulation
Next we study the constrained OSNR optimization problem from the system optimization point of view. A system optimization problem formulated as one of utility maximization problems is considered. The system optimization problem is subject to two specific constraints: The target OSNR constraint and the link capacity constraint. Let γi be the i th channel's target OSNR and γ = [ γ1, . . . , γm]
T . The target OSNR constraint can be written as
Another constraint is the link capacity constraint
The system cost function is composed of individual channel cost functions. Let Ci(ui) be channel i's individual cost function. It satisfies the following assumption: Assumption 1. Ci(ui) is strictly convex, continuously differentiable and
The system cost function is the sum of all individual cost functions. Thus the system optimization problem is formulated as
By using the OSNR model, (15) can be rewritten as
The associated vector form is
The link capacity constraint can also be written in a vector form,
where 1 is the m × 1 all ones vector. Thus the system optimization problem is formulated by
where the system cost function is
and the constraint set Ω is
We denote the system optimization problem by OP T ( Ω, C).
The condition (16) in Assumption 1 ensures that the solution to OP T ( Ω, C) does not hit ui = 0, ∀ i ∈ M. The following result adapted from [12] characterizes the unique solution of OP T ( Ω, C).
[12] If the following conditions on γ hold:
where Γ = [Γi,j] is the system matrix defined in (2) and
, then the constraint set Ω is non-empty and OP T ( Ω, C) has a unique positive solution u opt .
Remark 1. In the Nash game formulation, the OSNR target is not considered. Theorem 1 provides sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an NE solution for GAM E(M,Ωi, Ji). We notice from (13) that the ratio of βi to βmin is bounded in
which implies that channels are not allowed to ask unilaterally for a much higher OSNR target than others. In the system optimization formulation, the sufficient condition for the existence of a unique optimal solution for OP T ( Ω, C) provides explicitly the bound on channel OSNR targets.
COMPARISON OF OPTIMIZATION AND GAME FORMULATIONS
In this section, we compare the two approaches presented in Section 2 for a single point-to-point optical link. The comparison is motivated by the fact that an individual cost function Ci(ui) in OP T ( Ω, C) has an approximate interpretation similar to the one of the cost function Ji(u) in GAM E(M,Ωi, Ji). It is well known that there is no full efficiency in the Nash game. Instead of looking from the view point of degree of efficiency, our study focuses on the effects of parameters, which is somewhat related to pricing mechanism, [8, 10] .
Comparison of cost functions
Recall in Section 2.2, the individual cost function is selected such that it indicates each channel's preference for a better OSNR. This is realized by defining a utility function with respect to channel's OSNR. However, generally speaking, the convexity of the aggregate game cost function defined as
( 2 2 ) is not longer guaranteed. The following simple example illuminates this, in which we omit the penalty term and noise in the OSNR model for simplicity.
Example 1. Consider a Nash game with 3 players (m = 3) with individual cost functions,
It follows that
The sign of
is uncertain. Thus J(u) is not always convex with respect to u1, even though J1(u) is strictly convex with respect to u1.
Thus the constrained optimization problem associated with an aggregate cost function is not always a convex optimization problem and the optimal solutions are not immediate.
In fact the individual cost function Ci in the system optimization problem OP T ( Ω, C) in Section 2.3 can be defined similarly in the form of (7), Ci = Pi − Ui. The pricing function Pi is a linear function of ui. The utility function Ui is a logarithmic function of ui, which quantifies approximately the link's demand or channel's willingness to pay for a certain level of OSNRi based on the relationship between OSNRi and ui. The relationship is illustrated approximately in Fig.2 .
By this approximate definition, the individual cost function Ci is uncoupled in u for a given set of other power u−i. Furthermore, it has an approximate interpretation similar to the one of Ji. Thus we build the relation between these two formulations, i.e., GAM E(M,Ωi, Ji) and OP T ( Ω, C). We will compare simulation results based on this. Moreover, we select the system optimization formulation as the system framework to measure the efficiency of the NE solution.
Parameter selection strategy
The following parameter selection strategy provides a guideline for the selection of each βi, given channel OSNR targets. In GAM E(M,Ωi, Ji), the link sets fixed channel prices αi and channels decide their willingness βi to obtain higher OSNR levels. From the first-order necessary condition
we have
For a given OSNR target γi for each channel i, i.e, a lower OSNR bound, we can show that if βi is adjusted to satisfy
each channel achieves at least the γi level, i.e., OSNRi > γi. Thus this result briefly provides an idea of how to achieve given OSNR targets by tuning the parameters in associated cost functions in the game theoretic framework. Intuitively, larger βi possibly leads to increase the lower OSNR bound.
COMPARISON BY SIMULATIONS
Next we compare by simulation the two approaches for a single point-to-point optical link shown in Fig. 1 . The link has six channels (m = 6) and the link capacity constraint is P 0 = 2.5 mW (3.98 dBm). The associated system matrix Γ is obtained as 
Within the set of six channels, there are two levels of target OSNR, a 26 dB level desired on the first three channels and a 22 dB OSNR level on the next three channels.
In GAM E(M,Ωi, Ji), the individual game cost function defined in (7) is restated here,
(24) The NE solution is denoted by u * . The following gradient iterative scheme [14] 
where (3) is used and the step-size is selected as µ = 0.01.
Remark 2. Theorem 2 in [14] states that the gradient scheme converges to the NE solution if
where umin > 0 is a positive lower bound on each ui. The second condition sets a lower bound on βi. Since each channel attempts to select larger βi for the purpose of higher OSNR, the lower bound does not affect the results of the efficiency study.
In OP T ( Ω, C), instead of a generic Ci(ui), we use a specific individual cost function, i.e.,
as indicated in Section 3.1. The system cost function is C(u) := i∈M Ci(ui). The optimal solution is denoted by u opt . A dual algorithm presented in [12] 
where ui(t) = C
T , is used. We implement it in a distributed way:
The step-size is fixed for each channel with ki = 0.01, i = 1, · · · , 6.
Remark 3. Note that the two individual cost functions (24) and (25), have a similar structure. They both have a price term αiui. The utility term in (24) is in fact a function of OSNR, while the utility term in (25) reflects indirectly the preference for better OSNR based on the relationship between channel input power and OSNR (Fig.2) . The link capacity constraint is considered indirectly as a penalty term in (24).
We use the system optimization formulation C(u) with Ci(ui) defined as in (25) as the system framework to measure the efficiency of the NE solution u * . Furthermore, the parameters are selected to satisfy the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a solution and for the convergence of the algorithms. Specifically, the parameters in OP T ( Ω, C) are selected as αi = 1, i = 1, . . . The system cost values with respect to u opt is C(u opt ) = 4.5963.
Games without OSNR target
We present three cases in which the parameter selection strategy is not used as a guideline. In all cases, the userdefined parameters βi in GAM E(M,Ωi, Ji) are chosen as same as βi in OP T ( Ω, C), i.e., The link sets fixed αi at 0.001, 1 (same as in OP T ( Ω, C)) and 20, respectively. With these pricing mechanisms, the total power (uT ) vs iteration and channel OSNR vs channel number are shown in Fig 4, Fig 5 and Fig 5 for three cases. It is observed that without proper pricing mechanism, OSNR targets may not be achieved for some channels or all channels. The link capacity constraint is satisfied in all cases. Furthermore, we notice that the penalty term
in GAM E(M,Ωi, Ji) plays a key role with small αi. In other words, with larger αi (say, αi = 20 in the third case), total power is great smaller than the link capacity constraint. While with smaller αi in the first two cases, total power is approaching the constraint and higher channel OSNR is possibly achieved.
Channel powers, u opt and u * in three games vs channel number are shown in Fig. 7 . The system cost C(u) = i∈M Ci(ui) is evaluated via u opt and u * , respectively and is shown in Table 1 . Results imply that larger αi degrades system performance and even violate the system constraints.
In the following section, we use smaller αi. Specifically, we use αi = 1 in GAM E(M,Ωi, Ji) same as in OP T ( Ω, C) for comparison. 
Games with OSNR target
Next we present three other cases in which proper pricing mechanisms are chosen such that OSNR targets for all channels are achieved. Although the parameter selection strategy acts as a guideline for the selection of each βi, it is practically intractable. Thus we choose proper pricing mechanism in simulation by trial and error.
The parameters αi are set at 1 for all cases and βi are selected as in Table 2 such that different pricing mechanisms are chosen for GAM E(M,Ωi, Ji) by selecting different βi.
Since we do not use Monte Carlo method [6] to simulate, we select βi in three games by using the following rules. The efficiency of these two solutions u * and u opt , is compared by evaluating the system cost C(u) in Table 2 . The corresponding system cost values are obtained and shown in Table 3 . The results in Table 3 (compared with Table 1 ) verify that the efficiency in the solution of the Nash game (user optimization) can be improved by proper pricing mechanism. The fact that no full efficiency in the solution of the Nash game is a well-known fact in the literature of economics [5] , transportation [16] and network resource allocation [8] . Moreover, the Nash game solution gets very close to the optimal solution for system optimization (see Table 3 ). Furthermore, we can see that the NE solution in Game [c] is most efficient among these three cases. It implies that the efficiency can be possibly improved by appropriate selection of parameters. We recall that the parameters βi in the Nash game are upper-bounded by the condition (13) in Theorem 1, or in other words, the ratio of βi to βmin is upper bounded. The condition restricts each channel asking unilaterally for a much higher OSNR target than others. This phenomenon is also reflected in the selections of βi in three cases. We take Game [b] for an example. In this case, β3 = 9.4 which is greatly larger than other βi, indicating that channel 3 asks for a highest OSNR level. Meanwhile, channel 4 has the smallest β4 = 3.9. Thus the largest ratio of βi to βmin in Game [b] is around 2.41, which is also the largest ratio among the three cases (2.23, 2.41, 1.81, respectively). Recall that Game [b] also has the largest system cost value C(u * ), 4.6208. This phenomenon somewhat implies that the relative deviation of βi from the average may cause the degradation of system performance and less efficiency of Nash equilibrium.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have compared by simulation the two approaches, i.e., a system optimization approach and a user optimization (game-theoretic) approach. We first show that the aggregate cost function in the game-theoretic formulation is not automatically strictly convex and the optimal solution of the associated constrained optimization problem is not immediate. Then we build the relation between these two formulations by indicating that the individual cost function Ci(ui) in the system optimization formulation has an approximate interpretation with the cost function Ji(u) in the game-theoretic formulation. After that we compare the results based on this. It is well known that the Nash equilibria of a game may not achieve full efficiency. The comparison results have verified the inefficiency. We also show that OSNR target can be achieved and the efficiency can be possibly improved by appropriate selection of parameters.
In this paper, we select the system optimization formulation as the system framework used to measure the efficiency of the NE solution. A different system framework can be developed to study the efficiency problem. Questions are still remaining for applying Monte Carlo method numerically and an extension of this work theoretically.
